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Abstract 
This paper presents µgrid, a light weight middleware for grid applications, and focuses 
mainly on security issues -more specifically on the access control to resources - that are 
critical for the gridification of many medical applications. For this purpose, we use Sygn as 
a distributed, certificate based, and flexible access control mechanism, which has been fully 
integrated in µgrid. We discuss the advantages of the solution compared to classical grid 
approaches and the limitations of the final architecture. 
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1. Grids for managing medical images and data 
Grids are recognised as a promising technology to face the challenges of medical 
image processing and archiving [1][2][3]. However, data security and patient privacy 
remain a primary concern for porting medical applications on grids [4]. In a distributed and 
loosely controlled environment, data protection requires specific attention to avoid data 
leaks and to ensure the patient privacy. In an hospital, medical data should only be 
accessible by accredited persons. On a grid, data are distributed over different sites – for 
storage, archiving, or processing needs – that are administrated by different entities. Data 
may be sent outside of the health care centres (e.g. to a computing centre) and are thus 
exposed to a potentially much wider community of users or administrators. Therefore, strict 
protection of medical data based on users authentication and fine grain access control is 
mandatory. As grids serve an international and cross-organisational community of users, 
authentication should be organised appropriately to span across those boundaries. 
In this paper, we address the problem of access control of medical data. Given the 
number of actors involved in health care (nurses, physicians, secretaries, etc) and the 
complexity of the relationship between the administrative entities (hospitals, medical 
centres, research units, etc) hosting these actors (several physicians of different units or 
even hospitals may be involved) it is important that the access control system is flexible 
enough for common medical and clinical usage of the data. This implies the possibility for 
permission management at single user level as well as for groups of users. 
Many access control systems have been studied in the literature so far. CAS [5] and 
VOMS [6]  propose grid specific access control services. In CAS, all access rights are 
centralised at the CAS servers. In VOMS the servers store only group memberships while 
the group access rights are stored on the resource sites. Both approaches have the drawback 
of introducing a highly valuable target for attacks, additionally to the resource server and 
the user's machine. If a CAS server is attacked successfully the attacker can grant himself 
any rights he wants on all resources administrated by the CAS. In VOMS the situation is 
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not really better, since a successful attacker can make himself member of any group and 
then use the group access rights. 
Akenti [7] and PERMIS [8] are both access control services that use certificates to 
encode and protect their access permissions. Therefore both systems considerably reduce 
the amount of vulnerable data since only the information about the sources of authority 
(SOA), which are allowed to issue valid access permissions, has to be protected. However 
in both systems the access control server handles the storage and retrieval of permissions. 
This creates a point of failure in the access control process, since the permission storage 
may break down and therefore permissions may become inaccessible. Replication of 
permissions is not a good solution to this problem, since this requires additional 
mechanisms to keep the permissions coherent on all replication sites.  
In an application dealing with medical data, fast access to medical files is sometimes 
required to respond to an emergency: failure of access due to a third party is unacceptable. 
An authorised data access should only fail if either the user or the resource is disconnected 
from the grid. Our access control approach, Sygn, stores permissions with the users whom 
they concern. This makes it possible to eliminate any third party from the access control 
decision process. Furthermore this approach allows ad-hoc creation and direct transfer of 
permissions to the users, with no need of interaction with a third party permission storage. 
Setting up real scale grids is resource and time consuming. This makes the prototyping 
of a service such as the Sygn access control system hardly feasible. The human cost for 
setting up a full scale grid has often been largely under-estimated, failing to reach the high 
expectations of many grid end users. To enable prototyping and testing at a low cost, we 
have developed a simple yet rather complete grid middleware called mgrid (microgrid). It 
relies on robust standards such as TLS and X509 to enable transport security and 
authentication. mgrid provides a lightweight interface for prototyping and testing grid 
enabled features, without pretending to be a solution for production grid deployment. The  
mgrid middleware has been used for executing and optimising medical image processing 
applications such as content based search in medical image databases  [9]. 
The remaining of this paper first describes the mgrid middleware architecture and 
capabilities. The Sygn access control mechanism is then introduced. We present how Sygn 
and mgrid services can interoperate to build a secured data management system for medical 
data. Finally we conclude and discuss perspectives in medical grid deployment. 
2. mgrid, a lightweight grid middleware 
The mgrid middleware is designed to be very light weighted in order to remain easy to 
install, use and maintain. It was designed to use clusters of PCs available in laboratories or 
hospitals. Therefore, it does not make any assumption on the network and the operating 
system except that independent hosts with private CPU, memory, and disk resources are 
connected through an IP network and can exchange messages via communication ports. 
This middleware provides the basic functionalities needed for batch-oriented applications: 
it enables transparent access to data for jobs executed from a user interface. It is written in 
C++ and is built on a few standard components such as the OpenSSL library [10] for 
authenticated and secured communications, and the MySQL C interface for access to a 
database server [11]. 
The code of mgrid is licensed under the GPL and is freely available from the authors 
web page (see affiliation above). 
2.1. Architecture design 
In the mgrid middleware a pool of hosts, providing storage space and computing power,  
is transparently managed by a farm manager. This manager collects the information about 
the controlled hosts and also serves as entry point to the grid. As illustrated in Figure 1, the 
mgrid middleware is packaged as three elements encompassing all services offered: 
· A host daemon running on each grid computing host that manages the local CPU, 
disk, and memory resources. It is implemented as a multiprocesses daemon 
forking a new process for handling each task assigned. It offers the basic services 
for job execution, data storage and data retrieval on a farm. 
· A farm daemon running on each farm that manages a pool of hosts. It is 
implemented as a multithreaded process performing lightweight tasks such as user 
commands assignment to computing hosts. 
· A user interface that provides communication facilities with farm daemons and 
access to the grid resources. 
As discussed below, a grid daemon component should be added to enhance the 
scalability in the mgrid architecture. However it has not yet been imp lemented. 
The user interface consists of a C++ API. A single class enables the communication 
with the grid and the access to all implemented functionalities. A command line interface 
has also been implemented above this API that offers access to all the functionalities 
through four UNIX-like commands (ucp, urm , and uls for file management similarly to 
UNIX cp , rm, and ls commands respectively plus usubmit for starting programs 
execution on the grid). 
Figure 1. mgrid components and services. 
Although logically separated, the three mgrid components may be executed as different 
processes on a single host. The communications between these processes are performed 
using secured sockets. Therefore, a set of hosts interconnected via an IP network can also 
be used to run these elements separately. 
The  mgrid middleware offers the following services: 
· User authentication through X509 certificates. The authorization policy is 
described in the section 2.3. 
· Data registration and replication. The middleware offers the virtual view of a 
single file system though data are actually distributed over multiple hosts. Files on 
the hosts need to be registered at the farm to be accessible from the grid 
middleware. Furthermore data can be transparently replicated by the middleware 
for efficiency reasons. 
· Job execution . Computing tasks are executed on the grid hosts as independent 
processes. Each job is a call to a binary command possibly including command 
line arguments such as registered grid files. 
2.2. System workflow 
A minimal  mgrid is started by running a farm daemon first, followed by a single host 
daemon. Both the farm manager and the host manager make use of a service certificate to 
authenticate to each other. Certificates are delivered by a certification authority that can be 
set up using the “openssl req” and “openssl ca” sample commands offered in the 
openSSL distribution. 
The farm daemon role is to control a computing farm composed of one or more hosts. 
It holds a database of host capacities, grid files, and a queue of scheduled jobs. MySQL is 
used as database backend. When started, the farm daemon connects to the database 
backend. If it cannot find the mgrid database, it considers that it is executed for the first time 
and sets up the  database and creates empty tables. In the other case, it finds in the database, 
the list of grid files that have been registered during previous executions and the hosts 
where files are physically instantiated. 
The host manager role is to manage the resources available on a host. When started, it 


















It connects to the farm manager indicated on command line or in a configuration file to 
which it sends the host information. The host manager encompasses both a data 
storage/retrieval service and a job execution service. 
To make use of the system, a user has to know a farm manager to which its  requests 
can be directed. For convenience, the latest farm managers addressed are cached in the user 
home directory. Through the user interface, a user may require file creation, replication, or 
destruction, and jobs execution. These requests are sent to a farm manager which is 
responsible for locating the proper host able to handle the user request. To avoid 
unnecessary network load, the farm manager does not interfere any longer between the user 
interface and the target host, it only provides the user interface with the knowledge of the 
target host and then let the user interface establish a direct connection with the host for 
completion of the task. The system is fault tolerant in the sense that if the farm manager 
becomes unreachable (e.g. due to a network failure or the process being killed), the user 
interface parses the list of cached farm managers for completing the request. Similarly, if a 
worker node does not respond, it is declared "down" and removed from the farm manager 
list of known living hosts until it restarts and registers again. 
The following sections detail the services offered by the mgrid middleware. 
2.3. Authentication 
User authentication in a wide scale system such as a grid cannot be achieved by user 
accounts creation on all nodes where the user may need to access for scalability reasons and 
since the target hosts are not known in advance. Instead, in mgrid as in many grid 
middlewares, the user is authenticated through a personal certificate. We use X509 
certificates as (i) they are the de facto standard and (ii) tools to produce and manage them 
(such as the OpenSSL package) exist. 
User certificates are delivered and signed by a certificate authority for a limited period 
of time. Classic cryptographic techniques are involved to ensure the validity of the 
certificates produced. An X509 certificate holds the user name, group and affiliation, thus 
enabling authorization policies on a per user and a per institute basis.  In the mgrid system, 
the user certificate is used each time the user interface sends a request to the farm manager 
that will only accept the connection coming with a valid and signed certificate. The user 
passphrase is made mandatory (it is normally optional in OpenSSL) when using the 
certificate's private key, thus offering an extra level of protection. 
All communication between the user interface and the farm or host daemons are 
encrypted using OpenSSL thus preventing any third party spying the network to capture 
information such as the user identity, the files he or she owns, or the kind of processes he or 
she is requesting. 
2.4. Data management 
For maximal transparency and ease of use, mgrid allows a user to create, modify, and 
delete files “on the grid” without worrying of the files location and the disk space limitation 
of each host. The user can register and browse grid files into a virtual file system that 
appears as a classical file system tree but spawns over different disks. The virtual file 
system tree is hold in the farm manager database. At the beginning none of the files 
available on the grid hosts are known to the mgrid middleware nor accessible to the user. 
Files have to be registered first by explicit request of the user (or implicit request such as 
may happen during job execution). A file is registered in the virtual file system by copying 
the file to a free space (a physical instance of the file is created on a controlled host) and by 
binding it to its full path name in the virtual tree and its target host (we will refer to the grid 
file name to designate the name of the file in the virtual tree). The user may browse the 
virtual tree by changing its current directory and listing files available in each directory 
similarly to what is done in any file system. To enable per-user file classification, the mgrid 
middleware defines a virtual home directory for each user whose name is based on the 
information read from the user certificate (thus, uniqueness is ensured provided that the CA 
does not deliver different certificats with the same names and affiliations). 
The current mgrid middleware does not make any access control on the files, although 
basic control based on the user name, group and affiliation read from its certificate could be 
easily implemented. (The subject string would be stored in the farm manager table on file 
registration allowing the system to control file access at each user level). Even though, this 
access control mechanism would be limited as only the owner of a file could access it. The 
integration with Sygn (see section 3) enables finer access control and rights delegation.  
In addition, the grid data manager supports replication: to a grid file name may be 
associated several identical physical instances of a file recorded on different hosts. 
Replication may be ordered explicitly by the user but usually happens transparently for the 
system needs as described in the section on jobs management. These multiple instances of a 
file are kept on the nodes for caching in case of subsequent use, unless disk space is 
lacking. This replication of files causes an obvious problem of coherence that is not handled 
in the current implementation: the user is responsible for creating a new file in case of 
modification.  
Since we do not make any assumption on each host file system, each host is supposed 
to handle its own storage resources, not necessarily visible from the other hosts. At creation 
time, a grid node declares its available space to the farm manager and will send frequent 
updates of this value. The user always refer to a file through its grid name without needing 
to know its physical location.  
Figure 2. local and grid files 
Figure 2 illustrates the difference between local files and grid files created during file 
registration or file replication. A local file is available on the user disk. On request, the file 
is registered onto the grid and is assigned a grid file name that uniquely identifies it. The 
file may later on be replicated in several instances, all sharing the same grid file name. 
2.5. Job management 
The  mgrid middleware is a batch oriented system: the user interface submits tasks in 
the form of command lines and the farm manager is responsible for finding the adequate 
resources to fulfil the request. Job management is handled on a pull model: each host 
declares when it is free to the farm manager and the farm manager assigns computing tasks 
among the free hosts. Each time the farm manager is notified of a free host, it checks in its 
jobs queue for the oldest job that can be executed on this resource. Once assigned to an 
host, a job command line is executed on the target as an independent process forked by the 
host daemon. 
The user may specify minimal memory and disk requirements for its job to ensure that 
the execution will happen on an host able to process it. In addition, a job may access to grid 
files (input data) or register the result of its processing into a grid file (output data). The 
farm manager is responsible for finding a suitable host to handle the computation. It will 
therefore send the jobs on the host holding the required input data or it will order 
replication of the required input data on a selected target before ordering the job execution 
there. Replication is performed directly between the grid nodes owning and receiving a 
replica to guarantee maximal performance. 
Each time a computing request is queued by the farm manager, the scheduling 
algorithm establishes a list of suitable target hosts prioritised according to: 
1. Their readiness. 
2. The amount of data that has to be transferred to execute the job on this target. 
3. Their processing power. 
Later, it will be possible to introduce other parameters such as network bandwidth that 
is affecting the data transfer time. 
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To ensure transparency from the user point of view, the job submitter of the farm 
manager substitutes grid file names found in the job command line by the physical file 
names that will be found on the target host. Thus, the user can write a command line 
containing grid file name and open files in his or her code considering that the file  names 
transmitted will in fact be local files. Similarly, the user can specify output files to be 
registered onto the grid at the end of the processing (by prefixing the file names by 'of:'). 
The output files will be preserved and registered into the farm manager files database once 
the job is completed. Note that using this mechanism, the binary file to be executed might 
be designated through a grid file name that will be substituted. Thus, the user may register 
binaries in the grid file system and order execution of commands making use of these 
binaries. As any input file, the binaries will be transported on the target host prior to 
execution. 
The  mgrid middleware does not deal with heterogeneous platforms today: all hosts are 
considered to be binary compatible which solves the problem of registering several binaries 
corresponding to a single application for several targets, but it is clearly restrictive for a full 
scale grid. 
2.6. Perspectives 
In the current implementation, mgrid is not a scalable system yet although its 
architecture has been designed to ease scale extension. The farm managers clearly represent 
a bottleneck in the system that cannot manage an unlimited number of hosts. The idea is 
that a farm manager should only handle local resources (for which connections are fast and 
reliable) and that farms will become interconnected by a higher level grid manager process. 
Thus, farms would publish their statistics (number of workers, load, available data...) to 
their grid manager. When a request cannot be handled locally because of resources shortage 
(no host available or data not accessible in the local cluster), the farm manager could 
delegate the request to their grid manager which can take decision on optimal resources to 
use. Grid managers should be organised in a communicating graph of processes similarly to 
what is done in DIET [12] to ensure scalability. P2P technologies offer a promising 
background to ensure communications between all grid agents without requiring a N-to-N 
connectivity graph. 
3. The Sygn access control server 
As we have seen in the previous section, mgrid provides secured authentication of 
users, but access control to files is very limited. We have stated in the introduction the need 
of finer access control mechanisms in the medical area so that each user involved in 
healthcare can control the accessibility of the data he or she administrates.  
Sygn is an access control server developed at LIRIS. It implements user side 
permission storage. Sygn uses XML encoded certificates to specify resource access 
permissions. These certificates are digitally signed to detect unauthorised modifications. 
Two kinds of users exist in the Sygn architecture:  
· Users acting as resource administrators: these users want to control the use of their 
resources, and to grant permis sion to anybody. They use the Sygn admin client 
(SAC) for this purpose.  
· Users acting as resource consumers: these users want to access their permitted 
resources. They use the Sygn user client (SUC) to store owned permissions and 
retrieve resources according to these permissions. 
As a particular user may act both as a resource administrator and a resource consumer, 
only one client has been developed, acting as one or the other depending of the context.  
In Figure 3, a resource administrator stores some resource on a (possibly remote) 
resource server. He uses his SAC client to contact the resource server and register himself 
as source of authority (SOA) for this resource in the Sygn server metadata-base of the 
resource server (step 1). For each resource, the database stores only its SOA's identifier.  
When he wants to grant access to this resource to another user (step 2) the resource 
administrator issues permission certificate that allows access to this resource. Note that this 
process involves only himself and the concerned user(s), and can be done offline.  
When receiving the permissions the SUC client allows a user to store and retrieve these 
permissions as needed. To access the resource, the user contacts the corresponding resource 
server (we assume that the localisation of the correct server is realised by the grid 
middleware) and submits the request along with the needed permission certificates as 
shown in step 3. 
The resource server needs two different Sygn modules. The Sygn server that takes an 
access control decision based on the permission certificates provided by the user and a Sygn 
integration module, responsible for the interactions with the grid middleware, which is 
described in detail in section 4.  
 
Figure 3. Components of Sygn and their interactions 
 
4. Interoperating Sygn services and mgrid services for data management 
4.1. Interoperation of Sygn and a grid middleware 
The Sygn access control server is designed to interoperate with a grid middleware 
through an integration module. A request issued by a grid user contains the identifier of this  
user, the command to be executed and the accompanying Sygn permissions. When it arrives 
at the resource server, this module has the following functions: 
· Verify if  the request issuer corresponds to the owner of the submitted Sygn 
permissions. 
· Verify if the submitted Sygn permissions correspond to the submitted request. 
· Query the Sygn server to verify that the permissions are valid and allow or deny 
the submitted request. 
The rationale behind the first point is that authentication is not part of Sygn's services. 
If we did not check for correspondence between permission holder and grid user submitting 
a request,  any user could copy the permissions of an authorised user to gain access to 
resources. 
Secondly, checking if a Sygn permission applies to a grid request keeps the format of 
grid requests independent from the format of Sygn permissions. The correspondence checks 
are necessary, otherwise a user could pass a grid request for some resources using valid 
Sygn permissions for other resources. 
Finally the Sygn permissions are submitted to the Sygn server, which checks their 
validity and responds with either granted,  denied or failed messages. Granted means the 
permissions are valid, denied that they are invalid and failed means that the validity could 
not be verified due to a failure in the Sygn servers components (e.g. if the database is 
unavailable). The integration module interprets the Sygn server's response, launches the 
grid request if it was positive or returns an error message explaining why the request was 
rejected. 
4.2. Interoperate Sygn and µgrid 
We have created a Sygn integration module that empowers mgrid with the Sygn 
service. The actual integration is limited to file access control on mgrid using Sygn 
permissions. It enables access control for the command line functions as well as for the 
mgrid C++ API allowing to copy, upload, download and delete files in mgrid. If the Sygn 
use is made mandatory (an option at µgrid start-up), it becomes impossible for µgrid users 
to access files without the required permissions.  
One of the main issue for interoperating Sygn and µgrid was the place of Sygn in the 
µgrid middleware. Two possibilities arise from the µgrid architecture :  
· at the farm level, since it represents the entry point of µgrid, thus leading to a 
unique Sygn server for the grid –the whole set of physical servers is virtualised as 
only one; 
· alternatively, on a set of distributed Sygn servers, maybe on each resource server 
(but two µgrid servers can use the same Sygn server, a 1-to-1 mapping is not 
necessary). 
The first solution obviously leads to a bottleneck for the single Sygn server (all the 
requests occur there and the metadata base might be very large), as well as a single point of 
failure. We have thus chosen the second solution. 
In this solution, the workload is balanced between the Sygn servers. Two problems 
appear within this solution: the consistency of the view of the farm with the actual servers, 
and the consistency of the permissions due to file replication.  
The first problem concerns the consistency of the view on the files present at a given 
site between the farm manager and that actual site: indeed, a user command might be seen 
as acceptable by the farm manager but denied locally by the Sygn server. For instance, if a 
user wants to delete a grid file, the farm manager might update its database on the 
localisation of this file, even if the local access control made by Sygn denies this action, 
leading to a consistency failure. Thus, once approved but the Sygn server, the decision 
(request done, request failure) is returned to the farm manager so that it can keep a 
consistent view of the grid files. 
A second problem arises due to the replication of files. µgrid allows for a transparent 
replication of files among the resource servers. If a file is replicated without its permis sions, 
it will be either access free to everyone (if that server does not hold a Sygn server, which is 
possible if Sygn is made optional in µgrid) or non accessible to everyone (the local Sygn 
server does not know how to resolve access permissions for this file, because it is not 
referred in its local metadata base). The free access is eliminated by denying replication of 
controlled files on servers where Sygn is not running. The non-accessibility is tackled by 
replicating the file SOA's identifier at the destination, as this identifier is the only 
mandatory metadata the Sygn server needs for its access decisions. 
4.3. Examples of requests in µgrid, controlled by Sygn 
We start by presenting command line examples of the possible operations involving 
grid files and explaining the required permissions for these commands to successfully 
execute. 
Registering a local file to the grid requires to have write permission on the grid-file if it 
already exists (actually the user is overwriting the grid file with his local file). If the grid-
file does not exist the user copying the file is registered as the SOA for that grid-file. 
Copying a grid-file to another grid-file requires read permissions on the source file and 
write permissions on the target file (if it already exists). Retrieving a grid-file to a local file 
requires only read rights on the grid-file. The copy command (used for registration, copy, or 
retrieval depending on the source and destination file kind) has the following structure in 
the command line interface: 
 ucp lf:local-file gf:grid-file --sygn 
where the ‘lf:’ prefix designates a local file while the ‘gf:’ prefix designates a grid 
file. The --sygn option activates the SUC, which automatically retrieves and appends the 
correct permissions to this request (if the user holds these permissions). 
Deleting a grid file requires write permissions and is done through the following 
command: 
 urm gf:target-file –-sygn 
To use permissions in µgrid with the --sygn option, the user must import these in the 
SUC once and they will be available subsequently.  
The  µgrid  C++ API permits registration (local file to grid-file), retrieval (grid-file to 
local file), copying (grid-file to grid-file) and deletion of grid files. As the command line 
interface uses the API to execute its functions, the same access control requirements apply 
as above. 
The operations are provided as methods of an interface class that can be included and 
instantiated by user programs.  
5. Discussion on security issues 
The architecture presented in this paper can be compared globally with what can be 
found in Globus [13] using GSI [14] for authentication and CAS [5] for fine grain access 
control. It is far less developed in terms of functionalities for the grid usage and tools, but it 
is relevant to discuss the comparison from security point of view. The advantages of our 
model are that it does not rely on the grid architecture to delegate, obtain and manage 
permissions, nor does it rely on a remote server to store and hold these permissions. This 
minimizes the impact of a successful attack on a component of Sygn. The SUC stores no 
security-critical data, since all permissions it holds require prior authentication of their 
owner to be used. The SAC is not a good target either, since access to a SOA's private key 
is required to forge valid permissions. Therefore both components only require an adequate 
protection of the users private keys (owner private key for the SUC, SOA's private key for 
the SAC) which is a common requirement in distributed systems.  
Sygn servers are deployed at resource server level, thus they represent less valuable 
targets for attackers than a permission repository (for example a CAS server). A successful 
attack on a Sygn server only disables the access control on the attached resource server. 
Unlike Akenti [7] or Permis [8], Sygn does not involve a third party permission 
storage. The SUC permits to store all the permissions obtained by one user for his/her 
access on remote resource servers. Users are the only providers of  their permissions to the 
Sygn servers. 
Moreover, to completely fulfil the requirements of privacy protection, the data 
managed should also be encrypted. Indeed, the physical files on remote hosts must be 
protected against possible attacker on the operating system underlying the grid middleware. 
The Sygn architecture is fully compatible with another work of our team on distributed, 
encrypted storage making the disclosure of private data almost impossible in a real system 
[15]. Even if someone gets direct access to the data, he would not be able to decrypt its 
content.  
As value added features of Sygn (not discussed in this paper), we can manage groups 
of users and files, non-repudiation of access logging, black lists and permission revocation 
lists.  
The presented architecture of the combination of µgrid and Sygn is developed under 
GPL license. It is freely available and can be downloaded from http:// 
liris.cnrs.fr/~lseitz/software. 
6. Conclusions and perspectives 
We have presented in this paper two interesting tools for grid users and developers. 
The first one, µgrid, is a light weight middleware for grids, enabling basic commands on a 
set of hosts, for computing and data management purpose. The second one, the Sygn 
architecture, proposes an alternative to standard access control mechanism that can be 
found in today grids, allowing for a fine grain access control in a fully decentralised way. 
Sygn responds to the complex needs for authorisation arising in grid enabled medical 
applications. Finally, we have exhibited the interoperability of the two softwares and the 
feasibility to integrate the latter in a basic grid middleware.  
The future of this project is twofold. Concerning the middleware, we plan to extend the 
µgrid prototype in order to handle multiple farm managers, as explained in section 2.6. On 
the access control side, we want to finally integrate the Sygn architecture in a standard grid 
service middleware such an OGSA or WS-RF service. 
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